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Abstract 
 
Several conflict theorists have appropriated Hegel’s ‘struggle for recognition’ to highlight the 
healthy dimensions of conflict and to explore ways of reaching reconciliation through mutual 
recognition. In so doing, some scholars attend to the inter-personal dimension of 
reconciliation, while others focus on the inter-state dimension of reconciliation. This paper 
argues that both approaches miss important Hegelian insights into the modern state. Hegel 
understands that freedom must be situated and bounded in order to take a concrete form. He 
believes that concrete freedom and domestic reconciliation create an atmosphere that can 
pressure the state to be more confrontational with other states by attaining a stronger 
individuality. Thus, the common concern about freedom among Hegelian states remains a 
‘thin’ version of communication, vulnerable to such factors as national honor or recognition 
status. Hegel’s challenge urges peace-inspired scholars to explore ways of achieving concrete 
freedom and domestic reconciliation while simultaneously relieving interstate conflict. 
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Introduction 
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the positive role of conflict for creating 
constructive change processes. Instead of considering conflict as a force that is diametrically 
opposed to peace, several conflict scholars have highlighted the relevance of analyzing its 
context and dynamics in peace processes (e.g. Lederach, 1998; Lederach, 2003; Richmond, 
2011). Investigating the constructive opportunities that conflict can make, they argue, helps to 
reveal the deeper patterns of human relationship and causes of violence.1 Moreover, some 
theorists find this approach politically adequate, because it avoids excessive reliance on 
absolute moral values grounded in an idealistic world while at the same time serving to actively 
engage in the politics of this world (Geuss, 2010, pp, 31-41; Williams, 2005; Mouffe, 1993).  
Taken in this theoretical orientation, Hegel’s thought seems to be both insightful and 
problematic. On the one hand, Hegel scholars highlight his notion of the ‘struggle for 
recognition’ as illuminating the healthy dimensions of conflict and uncovering paths to 
reconciliation through mutual recognition (Taylor, 1994; Honneth, 1996; Lindemann and 
Ringmar, 2012). If peace and reconciliation are best sought through the strenuous process of 
conflict, and not through its absence, Hegel’s thought can provide a solid foundation for this 
line of reasoning. On the other hand, Hegel’s statements about the modern state and war 
appear to be highly problematic. The recurrent charge is that the Hegelian state could swallow 
up individuality and facilitate the rise of a totalitarian regime (Popper, 1996, p, 31; Cassirer, 
1946, pp, 248-276; Adorno, 1973, pp, 349-350). In a similar vein, some scholars in the field of 
international relations (IR) contend that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right mounts a strong defense of 
 
1  This idea resonates with the line of research on ‘positive peace’ that Galtung (1969) famously 
conceived as more than the absence of violence and that of ‘structural violence’ that attests to the 
significance of investigating the root causes of violence (Weigert, 2008).  
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state sovereignty and thus supports the assumptions of realist IR theory (Brook, 2012a, pp, 
134-143).  
Commentators have made numerous attempts to assuage such a difficult feature of 
Hegel’s thought (e.g. Avineri, 1996; Jaeger, 2002, p, 508; Brown, 2002, pp, 50-51). Among 
recent studies, there are two ways of dealing with Hegel’s state theory.2 One focuses on the 
master-and-slave narrative of recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. On this basis, it 
distinguishes a Hegelian theory of global justice from Hegel’s theory of international politics 
(Brook, 2012b; Geiger, 2007). The latter, mostly contained in The Philosophy of Right, is too 
outdated to be accepted in the era of globalization. The struggles for recognition among local 
actors are relevant to consider, but not those of state actors. Thus, this rendition of Hegel’s 
thought is aligned with some of the sociological literatures that treat the nation-state as an 
obstacle to promoting social movements of global justice (Kaldor, 2013; Smith, 2008). The 
other approach is found among several IR scholars inspired by social constructivism. Notably, 
Alexander Wendt argues that the culture of international politics will evolve to the point of 
necessitating a world state. Behind Wendt’s claim is the structuralist assumption that the state 
is not only real but it also has a personhood—an independent character not reducible to its 
constituents (Wendt, 2004). This is why the Hegelian struggle for recognition ‘operates on two 
levels simultaneously, between individuals and between groups’ (Wendt, 2003, p, 516). If the 
problem is that the Hegelian process of mutual recognition does not operate beyond state 
boundaries, this concern is overcome in Wendt’s structuralist appropriation of Hegel’s ideas. 
 
2 The article does not deal with the approach to radically depart from Hegelian understanding of 
recognition struggle and identity formation. Some scholars (Bartelson, 2013, pp, 125-127; Lebow, 2008) 
identify the ontological contrast between the Self and the Other in the Hegelian dialectic and claim 
that such a distinction is not necessary for identity formation. Though not ignorant of such a radical 
critique, this paper seeks to explore what Hegel’s statist model can provide for modern politics.  
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Just as individual struggles for recognition are reconciled in the state, struggles between states 
are reconciled within a supranational body like the world state.   
Whereas the first approach accentuates the individual’s capacity to influence politics 
by forming social movements, the second purports to capture the effects of the changing 
structure of international relations. In other words, one emphasizes the inter-personal 
dimension of reconciliation, while the other focuses on the inter-state dimension of 
reconciliation. Despite their difference, both approaches converge on the argument that the 
competitive nature of inter-state relations is a problem to overcome. Thus, one theoretical 
strategy is to argue that although it is crucial to know the actual context of recognition struggles 
occurring at the individual (and group) level, this task can be fulfilled without taking into 
consideration state institutions and interstate competition. The other one is to claim that 
states—which have the same psychological propensities as individuals—must facilitate the rise 
of the world state, because states are gradually cognizant of, and restrained by, the much higher 
cost of their competition due to the technological development of modern weaponry.  
This paper argues that although these approaches are founded on Hegelian principles, 
they miss important Hegelian insights. Hegel understands that freedom must be situated and 
bounded in order to take a concrete form, and that concrete freedom can be effectively 
realized in the modern rational state. He also believes that concrete freedom and domestic 
reconciliation create an atmosphere that can pressure the state to be more confrontational 
with other states by attaining a stronger individuality. For the creator of the recognition theory, 
then, reconciliation through mutual recognition does not point to a complete homogenization 
of humanity across all states. Rather, the common concern about freedom among Hegelian 
states remains a ‘thin’ version of communication, vulnerable to such factors as national honor 
or recognition status.  
  4
The article begins by articulating Hegel’s accounts of freedom. After explaining the 
significance that Hegel attributes to the state in achieving concrete freedom, the paper retrieves 
the contrasting relationship between domestic reconciliation and interstate conflict from 
Hegel’s state model. In so doing, it makes critical remarks on the recent appropriation of 
Hegel’s idea of recognition for cosmopolitanism. This study concludes with the suggestion 
that Hegel’s thought urges peace-inspired scholars to explore ways of achieving concrete 
freedom and domestic reconciliation while simultaneously relieving interstate conflict.  
 
Freedom and the State 
This section articulates how and why Hegel appreciates the modern state. Its basic argument 
is that for Hegel, our pursuits of freedom, as well as struggles for recognition, should occur in 
an institutionally articulated space, that is, the rational (or constitutional) state. In reaching this 
point, we should, at least briefly, discuss Hegel’s special terms like rationality and freedom.  
Readers of The Philosophy of Right can readily recognize Hegel’s positive view of the 
modern state. Needless to say, however, the world is full of historical examples of the state’s 
wrongdoings. Why, then, does Hegel so valorize the idea of the state? In a sense, The Philosophy 
of Right was an attempt to articulate the rational principles found in the modern state, that is, 
things related to how individual claims to rights and welfare are mediated through the state’s 
well-structured, well-functioning set of institutions. In this regard, if a particular state is 
identified as a despotic regime depriving the people of their basic rights, that situation only 
reveals how the state lacks what it is supposed to possess.  
Yet, by elevating the significance of the rational principles of the modern state, Hegel 
does not mean to confirm some kind of pure abstract thinking. As his famous dictum—‘What 
is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.’—suggests, Hegel (1991, p, 20) believes that 
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the task of philosophy is not to formulate some principles that are detached from the realities 
and necessities of a social world. Hence, if a state is recognized as despotic, the measure of 
this identification should not be a predetermined ethical ethos but the rational principles 
already embodied in the modern state and its social institutions. This is closely related to his 
view on reality: whereas mere existence (or what is simply seen in reality) does not fully reflect 
the rational, it is not entirely devoid of rationality either.3 Hegel characterizes his distinctive 
method:  
 
As far as nature is concerned, it is readily admitted that philosophy must 
recognize it as it is, that the philosopher’s stone lies hidden somewhere, but within 
nature itself, that nature is rational within itself, and that it is this actual reason 
present within it which knowledge must investigate and grasp conceptually—
not the shapes and contingencies which are visible on the surface, but nature’s 
eternal harmony, conceived, however, as the law and essence immanent within 
it. (Hegel, 1991, p, 12)  
 
This passage points out the need to comprehend ‘the content which is already rational’ in the 
actual world (Hegel, 1991, p, 11). In this methodological orientation, Hegel’s arguments about 
the state deal with the rational principles that are found in the structure of the modern state. 
Indeed, Hegel is convinced that rationality is already embodied in the modern state to a 
considerable extent—especially when compared with that of ancient society. On this ground, 
he reaches the conclusion that the state as such is worth retaining, even when the sovereign 
system of states may put them in conflict and create the possibility of war.  
We will soon turn to the case of war in Hegel’s thought. Prior to that, we need to 
specify what Hegel means by the rationality embodied in the state. This implies that when 
people form reasons in taking action at the concrete level, their reasons are already embodied 
 
 
3 This makes Hegel’s thought different from Kantian dualism. On the attempt to present Hegel as 
resisting typical incompatibilist libertarianism, see Pippin (2008).  
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in public institutions. At the same time, the embodied rationality highlights the crucial function 
of the state in achieving the good, that is, the role of the state in providing concrete terms 
through which citizens (ought to) understand the obligations that derive from their moral 
concerns. This further requires us to articulate what Hegel means by the good. Hegel (1991, 
p, 157) defines the good as ‘the Idea [considered] as the unity of the concept of the will and the 
particular will, in which abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing, and the contingency 
of external existence … are superseded; but they are at the same time essentially contained and 
preserved within it.’ Hegel’s point here is that the good is the unity of two essential qualities of 
freedom: abstract right and welfare. In the sphere of abstract rights, individuals are bearers of 
rights, the latter that should not be violated. Welfare, by contrast, is comprised of the demands 
of particular ends that must be satisfied for the individual to see herself as free. As far as Hegel 
is concerned, these two principles of freedom ought to complement each other. Hegel 
mentions two problems on this score. One problem is that abstract right alone lacks the 
minimal moral disposition that is necessary to motivate juridical claims. On the other hand, 
the pursuit of the demands of welfare, if not properly informed of individual rights, can 
dissolve into a radical subjectivism. The good in Hegel’s sense refers to the status of 
overcoming these possible defects and reconciling two initially separated principles of freedom 
(Franco, 1999, p, 214; Shelton, 2000, p, 392; Wallace, 1999). Once their unity is achieved, 
Hegel (1991, p, 157) understands that ‘welfare has no validity for itself as the existence of the 
individual and particular will, but only as universal welfare and essentially as universal in itself, i.e. 
in accordance with freedom.’ 
This then leads to another question: How does the unity of rights and welfare occur? 
Here the main concern is that there can be an indeterminable number of claims to rights and 
particular ends, and an enormous number of ways of combining them. With no limit, then, 
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claims to rights and welfare and their proper reconciliation cannot be actualized. The modern 
constitutional state, Hegel claims, resolves this problem in that it provides the concrete setting 
for the unity of rights and welfare for all. In Hegel’s view, individual claims are mediated within 
the constitution by the institutional articulation of the universal rights they have and the 
particular ends they pursue. Thus, the state is crucial for concrete freedom as the condition 
that enables the good to be realized. Hegel (1991, p, 285) makes this point clear by arguing: 
‘[t]he determinations of the will of the individual acquire an objective existence through the 
state… The state is the sole precondition of the attainment of particular ends and welfare.’  
But there can be at least two general concerns about Hegel’s state model. One is 
whether this model imposes an excessive and illiberal degree of identification with the state 
on the citizens. While this is an important challenge, Hegel’s thought is too complex to be 
dismissed as anti-liberal. For example, Hegel (1991, p, 282) considers the rational state as the 
one in which ‘personal individuality and its particular interests should reach their full development 
and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society).’ 
Here Hegel tries to assure us that the individuals in the modern state are not docile subjects 
who merely succumb to the authority of the state. Hegel (1991, p, 282) also makes it clear that 
the rational state actualizes freedom, ‘not in accordance with subjective caprice, but in 
accordance with the concept of the will, i.e. in accordance with its universality and divinity.’ 
In Hegel’s thinking, then, ruling over the people according to the arbitrary will of a despot 
does not match with the rational state. So, if a particular state is operated ‘by that feeling which 
reserves the right to do as it pleases, [or] by that conscience which identifies right with 
subjective conviction,’ Hegel would argue that that state is alienated from the constitution and 
‘imperfect’ (Hegel, 1991, p, 17; p, 282).  
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Secondly, there can be a question about whether the modern state has ever reached 
the point of serving the exalted function in ethical life that Hegel assigned it. Does the modern 
state provide for ‘the transition of individual into communal life in the way Hegel’s theory 
demands,’ or do modern individuals really ‘identify themselves rationally with their social roles’ 
(Wood, 1990, p, 259)? As will be detailed in the next section, Hegel acknowledges that the 
specific extent to which citizens are committed to, or alienated from, the state can be varied 
on a case-by-case basis. Overall, though, he insists that some comprehensive modes of 
thinking exist in the modern world and modern individuals are not completely alienated from 
the whole, that is, the rational state. 4 He adds that the reason why the political disposition to 
reconcile individual interests with those of the state is not easily identifiable is because it takes 
a habituated form. Hegel (1991, p, 289) specifies this idea by considering patriotism of modern 
citizens as the ‘disposition which, in the normal conditions and circumstances of life, habitually 
knows that the community is the substantial basis and end.’ This habitual confidence in the 
state makes modern citizens’ patriotic disposition embedded in their ordinary lives. In the 
ethical moment of war, however, the subconscious patriotic mindset renders itself more visible. 
Hegel (1991, p, 361) argues that war serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of the 
rational state, revealing that the concrete way of actualizing freedom is not feasible without 
the state. By drawing attention to the warrior-like image of modern citizens who risk their lives 
in defense of their public space for concrete freedom, Hegel’s thought on war challenges the 
claim that individuals in the modern world are completely disconnected and selfish. In his 
 
4 Shelton (2000, pp, 395-396) provides a helpful illustration of this point. He supposes that American 
automobile manufacturers lost competitiveness and encountered economic difficulty in foreign 
markets. Shelton speculates that as modern individuals, they should be informed that petitioning for 
the government’s direct purchase of American automobiles can bring about adverse economic impact 
or the tax burden on fellow citizens. As such, some kind of holistic thinking, if habituated, restrains 
and affects their actions. 
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view, the cause of modern citizens’ commitment to the rational state cannot be reduced to 
personal interest and honor.5 Instead, such a commitment derives from the fundamental 
concern about how to achieve freedom. Reconciling their particular interests with those of the 
state, modern individuals develop the conviction that their particular ends and welfare cannot 
be actualized if the state is lost. In that regard, protecting their communal space for concrete 
freedom becomes the chief reason of modern warfare.6 
 
The State and War  
The preceding section explained why Hegel values the modern state. In his view, the state was 
essential for achieving concrete freedom. This section investigates how Hegel’s state model 
affects his views on war (revolution and interstate war). In so doing, it makes the argument 
that the Hegelian state has two related features: domestic reconciliation and interstate conflict.  
 
Domestic Reconciliation 
According to our discussion of Hegel’s idea of the state in the previous section, it is not 
difficult to reach the conclusion that Hegel objects to revolution. Hegel claims that we, the 
modern, have found a concrete way of actualizing freedom, that is, the rational state where 
our individual claims are mediated by the institutional articulation of the rights we have and 
 
5 Hegel sees a fundamental difference between the state and civil society, and this explains why he 
thinks that personal interest is insufficient for generating citizens’ devotion to the state. For Hegel, the 
state should be more than a place of taking care of ‘the security of the life and property of individuals 
(Hegel, 1991, p, 324).’ The Hegelian state does not ignore individual interests but this cause fits more 
with civil society than the state. Secondly, as Smith (1983, p, 629) points out, Hegel questions if 
pursuing personal honor and excellence can be the real cause of generating the commitment of modern 
citizens to the state. In Hegel’s view, a war driven by personal honor is more compatible with the image 
of the ancient warrior than that of its modern counterpart.  
 
6 As will be discussed toward the end of next section, however, the theme of domestic reconciliation 
in Hegel’s thought also makes it difficult that the Hegelian state limits warfare to a defensive purpose.  
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the ends we pursue. If everything is perfectly mediated and reconciled, then there will be no 
need to resort to civil war. So the case seems to be rather simple—Hegel dismisses revolution.  
But Hegel is also aware that there is variation in the extent to which citizens are 
committed to, or alienated from, the state. In Hegel’s writings, we identify at least two other 
cases than the fully rational state. For an analytical purpose, let us name them immature and 
dysfunctional states. First, the immature state refers to the condition that Hegel (1991, pp, 282-
283) describes as ‘[i]mperfect states … in which the Idea of the state is still invisible and where 
the particular determinations of this Idea have not reached free self-sufficiency.’ A good case 
in point is the ancient states where ‘the subjective end was entirely identical with the will of 
the state (Hegel, 1991, p, 285).’ Both in The Philosophy of History and The Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
argues that the modern state is different from the ancient state because the inner, subjective 
life is respected in the modern state.7 Thus, if a state completely lacks the modern function 
Hegel characterizes, that state has to be immature—not fully grown to the level of the modern 
rational state. In such a case, Hegel’s position on revolution can be affirmative; that is, Hegel 
would not object revolution, while conceding the possibility that the evolving rational 
consciousness of the people leads to revolution and culminates in the establishment of the 
rational state.  
Once the people have established the rational state, does this mean that they have to 
always conform to the authority of the constitution and meekly follow it? Hegel does not think 
so. In fact, he points out the need of gradual institutional reform even for the rational state. 
Of course, Hegel is fundamentally a thinker who values the crucial function of the constitution 
 
7 Hence Hegel’s famous claim: ‘in the oriental world, one is free; in the Greek and Roman world, some 
are free; and in the Germanic, all are free.’ (Hegel, 1975, p, 54). Yet, whether the rational state as 
immanent development of concrete freedom is identical with the European state model remains 
contested. See, for a critical analysis of Hegel’s position on this issue, Tibebu (2011).  
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as the basic institutional structure of the state; the constitution, in his view, should condition 
every lawmaking activity of the modern state. But Hegel (1991, p, 336) also highlights that ‘the 
constitution … undergo[es] further development through the further evolution of the laws.’ 
In his observation, the incremental modifications to the constitution slowly accumulate and at 
some point, the constitution would look like having gone through a considerable change 
(Hegel, 1991, p, 337). The dysfunctional state appears when the constitution does not keep up 
with the progressive spirit of the people. In that case, the state puts itself in increasing 
discontent and becomes susceptible to revolution (Hegel, 1995, pp, 269-271). Hegel (1964, p, 
244) decries such inflexible states: ‘How blind they are who may hope that institutions, 
constitutions, laws which no longer correspond to human manners, needs, and opinions, and 
from which the spirit has flown, can subsist any longer; or that forms in which intellect and 
feeling now take no interest are powerful enough to be any longer the bond of a nation.’ Under 
this circumstance, Hegel would not disapprove of revolution.8  
Thus, Hegel both rejects and accepts the idea of revolution.9 On the one hand, the 
theme of reconciliation is strong in the rational state. Unless a state remains immature (namely, 
completely lacking the moments of the rational constitution), Hegel would advise that our 
political activities be conditioned and mediated by the constitution. On the other hand, though, 
the reformist claim becomes stronger, eventually to the extent of revolution, if more and more 
rational individuals find their interests incompatible with the extant constitution and if the 
latter continues to fail to acknowledge their claims. Taking these two points together, it can 
 
8 The more reformist (and less reconciliationist) language is found in Hegel’s early writings. See, for 
more examples, Hegel (1936, p, 352); Hegel (1984, pp, 122-123); Hegel (1964, pp, 243-245). 
 
9 As Hutchings (2012, p, 138) suggests, the tension between these two points could be relieved if we 
do not approach Hegel normatively, that is, as if Hegel presented his idea of freedom as “a static 
universal.”  
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be argued that although the theme of reform and even revolution never disappears in his 
thought, Hegel also thinks that the process of change is neither immediate nor dependent on 
individual (or collective) caprice.  
This presentation of Hegel’s thought as opposed to popular impatience with laws but 
open to gradual institutional reform is predicated upon the judgment that the modern state, in 
principle, is not the same as the ancient state—that is, not ‘immature.’ Needless to say, the 
extent to which the citizens of different states are devoted to their common space of politics 
and the ways in which the different governing bodies reflect their citizens’ rational interests 
must be varied. Aside from such an empirical variation, though, most modern states at least 
aspire to take the form of the rational state in which individual interests are fully developed 
and recognized. Given his belief in this modern accomplishment, Hegel does not take 
revolution as something that has to be always praised and repeated for the initiatory dimension 
it creates. Instead, the act of revolution, for Hegel, involves making a practical judgment, that 
of exploring a reasonable point of compromise between how our rational interests are 
acknowledged and how we cherish the common space as the constitution.10 Hegel trusts in 
the rationality embodied in the modern state, so he would first expect that individual claims 
to rights and welfare are mediated through the state’s well-structured set of institutions. This 
emphasis on domestic reconciliation does not mean that Hegel is totally opposed to revolution. 
It only says that if the state takes a modern, rational form, the development of violent 
 
10 Geiger (2007, p, 6; pp, 94-139) argues that Hegel’s statements about revolutionary war cannot fit 
with the existing ethical community, because war is in effect the complete collapse of the ethical sphere. 
In Hegel’s view, however, revolution does not radically transform what is already in place or what has 
been found in the modern state—that is, the rational principles regarding how to actualize freedom in 
a concrete way. Besides, Hegel sees revolutionary war as more than showing the significance of the 
initiatory act for politics. Revolution, for Hegel, also serves as a reminder to reveal the importance of 
the constitutional state, without which the concrete way of actualizing freedom is not possible. 
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revolution would be slow to occur; and that insofar as the rational state accommodates gradual 
institutional reform, violent revolution would become less and less likely.  
 
Interstate Conflict 
The preceding discussion leads to the question of whether the rationality embodied in the state 
could be also applied to international relations. If the rational principles are found in the 
modern state, can we appropriate them as the common standard to adjudicate interstate affairs? 
To put it in a different way, if most states adopt the same form of constitutional government, 
would it make the world easier to be regulated and peaceful? If it is Hegel’s claim that 
individual interests and state interests are more and more reconciled, can we also take Hegel 
to argue that that would eventually create something like common world culture across state 
boundaries and the circumstance conducive to peace?  
The argument, often dubbed ‘the end of history,’ offers the most affirmative response 
to these questions (Kojève, 1980, pp, 158-62; Fukuyama, 1992). It argues that the total 
rationalization of humankind would occur among Hegelian states, and this condition in turn 
would bring about a complete resemblance or homogenization of humanity across all states. 
Such a teleological worldview has many variants (Doyle, 1986; Rawls, 1999; Wendt, 2003; 
Weiss, 2009). But all these approaches underrate Hegel’s emphasis on the exclusive nature of 
the rational state in its relations with other states. In so doing, they overlook the important 
feature of Hegel’s notion of freedom that in order to be take a concrete form, freedom must 
be situated and bounded. After all, those teleological arguments fail to capture a close relation 
of the internal aspect of the state to the external aspect of the state; that is, the state, for Hegel, 
does not pursue individuality for the sake of individuality, but the constitutive nature of the 
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state (as the entity that actualizes individuals’ freedom) mandates such an exclusive identity 
formation. Let me explain.  
According to Hegel (1991, p, 359), the peaceful state within which domestic 
reconciliation occurs is ‘that in which all branches of civic life subsist, while their collective 
and separate subsistence proceeds from the Idea of the whole.’ This statement assumes two 
things: on the one hand, individual units should be able to identify themselves as members of 
the whole; on the other hand, the whole should be able to contain those units as its parts.11 
Hegel (1991, p, 359) details this idea:  
 
Internal sovereignty is this ideality in so far as the moments of the spirit and of 
its actuality, the state, have developed in their necessity and subsist as members of the 
state. But the spirit, which in its freedom is infinitely negative reference to itself, is 
just as essentially being-for-itself which has incorporated the subsistent differences 
into itself and is accordingly exclusive. In this determination, the state has 
individuality, which is [present] essentially as an individual and, in the sovereign, 
as an actual and immediate individual. 
 
The state’s ‘individuality’ discussed here refers to the status of the unity of diverse institutions 
(or ‘moments of the spirit’) that are developed in response to the rights and welfare of 
individuals. In other words, in pursuing individuality in its relations with other states, the state 
as a whole should make sure that its parts reach their full development and operate as different 
but connected members. This suggests that in Hegel’s state model, different individual and 
collective entities are not those that await elimination but instead are contained as (reconciled) 
parts of the state. Accordingly, the cited passage confirms two aforementioned conditions of 
the Hegelian state: individuals should be able to identify themselves as members of the whole; 
yet, in order to accommodate those parts into itself, the state as a whole should be bounded. 
 
11 Erman (2013) captures this point when she argues that both the external inter-state aspect and the 
internal intra-state aspect of statehood should be considered for the practice of state self-determination.  
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These features of Hegel’s state help to see how the internal aspect of the state affects its 
external relations with other states. Having a delimited structure, or what Hegel prefers to call 
‘individuality,’ the state follows the negative logic of the spirit in self-comprehension, and this 
in turn renders the state exclusive in its external relations with other states. Hence the 
contrasting logic: as the state actualizes internal integration (domestic reconciliation), its 
external representation takes an exclusive form (interstate conflict).  
What this contrast implies for us is the difficulty in directly applying a shared ground 
established in the intra-dimensional politics into the inter-dimensional politics. According to 
Hegel, such a common ground is confined within the state, because individuals develop a 
particular way of reconciliation with the state, and the state as a whole—which contains those 
reconciled individuals—represents an exclusive identity in its external relations. That is, in 
interstate relations, the Hegelian state is seen to have a distinctive rational structure. In fact, 
this view on the rational state is consistent with the basic Hegelian narrative. Human beings 
develop moral obligations through interaction with communities. These communities in turn 
can hold different, or even conflicting, views on how general moral principles are to be 
interpreted and prioritized in local situations. Hegel thinks that at the highest level, the rational 
state plays a crucial role in achieving the good—the unity of two essential, conflicting qualities 
of freedom. Through the state, the citizens discover and develop distinctive ways of satisfying 
individual interests. As one commentator notes, Hegel considers ‘the state as the largest 
effective ethical community [which] binds the individual in ways that smaller, partial 
communities should not and larger, more abstract communities cannot (Stillman, 2009, p, 37).’ 
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In Hegel’s belief, there is no adequate substitute for the sovereign state system if we desire to 
actualize concrete freedom.12  
In order to understand Hegel’s argument that the state needs to have an internally 
bounded and externally exclusive identity, let us pretend that the principles of sovereignty were 
nominal and the differences among states were almost non-existent.13 In this situation, people 
traveled freely across state boundaries and imagined what they could do elsewhere that they 
could not do within their states. Because Hegel understands that the state exists only in the 
dispositions of individuals, those states in the purely cosmopolitan world would be too loose 
to function as an ethical community responsible for their citizens. Consequently, there would 
be no concrete way of actualizing freedom, except any number of indeterminate claims to 
abstract rights and welfare. Hegel here would remind us of the crucial role of the state for 
concrete freedom, arguing that for this cause of freedom, states are logically mandated to 
represent an exclusive identity.   
What are the implications of this for the question of war? Earlier, we discussed that 
for Hegel, the citizens’ patriotic disposition is embedded in the ordinary circumstances of life 
due to their habitual confidence in the state. As Shlomo Avineri (1996, p, 137) points out, such 
habituated patriotism should not be confused with the total militarization of entire civilian 
population. Rather, war in this situation appears as a possible manifestation derivative of the 
 
12 Hegel (1991, p, 282) refers to the Holy Alliance, only to rebut it as ‘purely relative and limited, like 
[the ideal of] perpetual peace.’ 
 
13 Greenhill (2008, p, 351) observes a similar problem that might occur if the state fails to have a 
bounded feature. In his view, this is likely to happen when constituent members ‘seek recognition from 
different others,’ the situation that would undermine the cohesiveness of existing collective identities. 
However, Greenhill overlooks that this is a problem that is more or less overcome in the Hegelian 
state. For Hegel, the ‘living’ state is not a compilation of different individual interests and needs (the 
kind which fits with Hegel’s understanding of civil society). Instead, individuals are relatively reconciled 
with the state. Hence, the occurrence that a constituent member freely goes on to engage in the struggle 
for recognition with other collective or individual members may not be frequent enough to validate 
Greenhill’s concern. We will revisit this point next section.  
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‘non-instrumental’ relationship between the citizens and the state (Walt, 1996, p, 173). In this 
regard, Hegel would reassure us that the state does not enforce citizens’ sacrifice, but instead 
a duty of sacrifice emerges from, and constitutes, their reconciled relationship with the state.  
But this account is certainly not enough to dismiss our concern about the Hegelian 
state. For the Hegelian state system has two interconnected aspects of state sovereignty: for 
the internal actualization of freedom, the state is mandated to be exclusive in its relations with 
other states. By this contrasting relationship between domestic reconciliation and interstate 
conflict, it happens that the more the state is reconciled with its patriotic citizens, the higher 
the intensity of its interstate conflicts. Understood this way, war does not occur only among 
‘imperfect’ states (either immature or dysfunctional).14 Those fully rational or ‘perfect’ states 
that achieve domestic reconciliation would have to wage war as well. Thus, if the occurrence 
of war is a standard according to which a state is judged to be imperfect, the Hegelian state 
model suggests that once that state is perfect in domestic politics, it is imperfect in interstate 
relations.  
Furthermore, the contrast between domestic reconciliation and interstate conflict 
complicates our (liberal) expectation that ‘[t]he purpose of war, for Hegel, is to defend freedom 
and to preserve the ethical life which makes it real for members of a particular political 
community (Gordon, 2000, p, 321).’ 15  Indeed, defensive war alone underestimates the 
destructive potential that derives from the intensifying confrontation between those states that 
have gained more and more individuality. The point is that such an external manifestation of 
 
14 Hence, Vincent (1983, p, 203) is inaccurate to argue that ‘war [for Hegel] is an indication of the 
imperfection of states.’ 
 
15 See also Avineri (1996, pp, 137-9); Rawls (2000, pp, 359-60).  
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states is not likely to create the situation conducive to war fought for defensive purposes. 
Hegel (1991, p, 369) is well aware of this problem when he observes:  
 
But which of these [interstate] injuries should be regarded as a specific breach 
of treaties or as an injury to the recognition and honor of the state remains 
inherently indeterminable; for a state may associate its infinity and honor with 
any one of its individual interests, and it will be all the more inclined to take 
offense if it possesses a strong individuality which is encouraged, as a result of 
a long period of internal peace, to seek and create an occasion for action 
abroad.16  
 
The passage is clear about how the Hegelian state is enmeshed in interstate war. If the domestic 
reconciliation helps to accumulate a longer period of internal peace, it also takes the effect of 
pressuring the state to be more confrontational with other states by attaining a stronger 
individuality. Given this high intensity of conflict, it would not be surprising if the state 
becomes so sensitive to its recognition and honor that it initiates war. In addition, the national 
honor and the status of recognition cannot be considered rational factors—meaning that they 
would be much more difficult to institutionalize and control (e.g. Lindemann, 2010). As D.P. 
Verene (1996, p, 152) points out, Hegel understands that ‘peace [rarely] depends upon the 
institution of a set of principles for the actions of nations.’ By observing those irrational 
aspects as manifested in interstate relations, Hegel remains skeptical about the claim that 
international affairs can be regulated by the common rational principles. Rather, interstate 
affairs among Hegelian states is much more conflict-driven, and more vulnerable to violence, 
than some liberal commentators argue. This is so, paradoxically, when those states seek to 
preserve the ethical life which makes freedom real for the citizens within their national 
boundaries.  
 
16 Similarly, Hegel (1991, p, 362) argues that ‘even if a number of states join together as a family, this 
league, in its individuality, must generate opposition and create an enemy.’ 
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The Scope of Reconciliation 
At the outset of this paper, I identified two ways of appropriating Hegel’s ‘struggle for 
recognition.’ One is the interpretation of Hegel that resonates with cosmopolitan theories of 
social movement and world culture. This approach focuses on Hegel’s idea of the master-and-
slave narrative of recognition and uses it to raise the relevance of attending to the recognition 
and non-recognition status of local actors in conflict. From our discussion on Hegel, however, 
it is clear that such an interpretation underrates Hegel’s persistent concern about the crucial 
role of mediation and the importance of the state for this purpose. Hegel believes that 
rationality is embodied in the rational state; in his view, maintaining and cultivating this 
modern asset is as important as identifying unacknowledged voices in society. He considers 
the state as the condition that enables the good (the unity of abstract rights and particular 
claims of welfare) to be actualized and thus finds it crucial for concrete freedom. To 
cosmopolitan theorists of global social movement, then, Hegel would ask whether and how 
concrete freedom can be effectively realized in other system than the state.  
The other misunderstanding is to maintain that there is a strong reconciliatory 
dimension for interstate relations in Hegel’s thought. Since I already discussed the difficulty 
to match a teleological worldview with Hegel’s case of interstate war, in the following I focus 
on a recent variant of that, IR theorist Alexander Wendt’s extensive analysis of the necessity 
of a world state (Wendt, 2003). Unlike the aforementioned theories of global social movement, 
Wendt attends to Hegel’s emphasis on state structure and its role of mediation. For example, 
Wendt (2005, p, 597) argues that structure contributes to ‘agency’s fullest expression,’ rather 
than operating as ‘always a limit on agency.’ In his usage, however, structure connotes both 
the state in relation to individuals and the world state in connection with states. Wendt thus 
claims that the Hegelian struggle for recognition operates at interstate relations in the same 
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way as at inter-personal interactions. That is, if individuals are reconciled with the 
constitutional state, so are states with the world state. What makes this possible, in Wendt’s 
view, is that the state has independent personhood (Wendt, 2004; Wendt, 1999, pp, 193-245). 
Therefore, as in the case of human persons striving for recognition in Hegel’s narrative, the 
state engages in struggles for recognition, which would eventually lead to the establishment of 
a world state.  
Wendt’s ‘structuralist’ presentation of IR social constructivism has generated 
numerous responses (e.g. Copeland, 2000; Shannon, 2005; Greenhill, 2008; Wight, 2004). 
Some critics even raise the concern that Wendtian structural determinism has the effect of 
obscuring the contingency of political action and denuding human agency (Scheuerman, 2011, 
p, 146; Jackson, 2004, p, 285; Franke and Roos, 2010, pp, 1060-1063). But from the Hegelian 
perspective proposed in this article, Wendt should be credited at least for exploring the 
structural dimension of the state that is not reducible to its constituents. Not all activities of 
the state can be explained with reference to individuals and groups within the state. Hegel too 
thinks that the state is more than the compilation of individual interests. Individuals in Hegel’s 
state model are those who are relatively reconciled with the state, though this understanding 
does not deny gradual institutional reforms. In Hegel’s view, then, it is less persuasive to claim 
that individuals are the sole actors possessing active causal powers. Individuals do act and 
make changes in Hegel’s state system, but the nature of their action is not driven by 
individuated socio-economic interests or personal honors.17 Instead, reconciliation affects 
 
17 In their critique of Wendt’s idea of state personhood, Franke and Roos (2010, pp, 1071-1072; p, 
1076) argue that whereas the social world is composed of ‘Me-self’ (structural potentials) and ‘I-self’ 
(disruptive actors), it is ‘I-self’ or its contingent character that causes change. But Hegel would question 
if those disruptive actors always constitute the modern state, and if the state can be easily disposed of 
for individuals’ subjective caprice.  
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political action—that is, action appears as a mediated form in the context of the state that 
reflects the idea of the whole.  
But the fact that individuals are reconciled with the state also highlights Wendt’s 
misconstrual of Hegel’s thought. True, Hegel describes the state as having individuality. This 
might invoke Wendt’s claim that the state has actual personhood including some essential 
human qualities such as intentionality and consciousness. For Hegel, however, the state has 
individuality not because individuality is good for its own sake; but because in order to 
accommodate reconciled individual parts into itself, the state as a whole has to be bounded 
and exclusive. Instead of forcing an arbitrary agenda into its constituents, the state that Hegel 
advocates serves to actualize their freedom, so that each of them reaches distinctive 
development but operates as reconciled members in the state. The Hegelian state, at least in 
principle, is never discharged from this task of achieving concrete freedom. For Hegel, if 
reconciled individuals constitute the state, the state is also informed of the responsibility to 
achieve and sustain concrete freedom and domestic reconciliation. In terms of the causal 
power to explain the public world, then, neither the state having independent personhood nor 
the citizen pursuing an individuated socioeconomic interest is enough. Both reconciled 
individuals and responsible states should be taken into consideration.  
If the state does not have the independent personhood that Wendt describes, it is 
difficult to accept his claim that states struggle for recognition and establish a world state. 
Hegel (1991, p, 368) makes it clear that states, unlike individuals in civil society, ‘are primarily 
wholes which can satisfy their own needs internally.’ That is, although the state holds some 
independent character irreducible to individual members, its activity is inclined toward meeting 
the demands of concrete freedom and domestic reconciliation. This dual feature renders states 
totalities that are nonetheless dependent on their internal needs. Thus, ‘[their] relationship … 
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is a relationship of independent units which make mutual stipulations but at the same time 
stand above these stipulations (Hegel, 1991, p, 366).’ For the Hegelian state has a fundamental 
concern about domestic reconciliation, and this need makes the reflexive effect that the state 
as a whole that contains reconciled constituent members should be exclusive in its external 
relations with other states. As a result, the common concern about freedom among Hegelian 
states is bounded within each state and thus remains a thin version of communication across 
state boundaries (Hegel, 1991, p, 368). Moreover, from Hegel’s state model it is revealed that 
the more the state achieves domestic reconciliation for concrete freedom, the stronger its 
individuality. This creates the environment under which states are more and more sensitive to 
their recognition status and honor. So, the contrasting relationship between domestic 
reconciliation and interstate conflict found in Hegel’s thought makes Wendt’s depiction of a 
gradually stabilizing world much more difficult to accept.  
 
Conclusion 
Hegel’s concept of the struggles for recognition has received much attention in recent 
scholarship on international politics. Its increasing popularity might be attributed to his equal 
interest in conflict and reconciliation. But in terms of how to situate these two themes in 
Hegel’s thought, scholars have provided varied responses. The main purpose of this paper was 
to articulate how for Hegel, conflict and reconciliation are varied according to domestic and 
interstate levels of politics. For this, two points were made. The first was that Hegel is a theorist 
who opposes the mere reduction of citizens to docile subjects but nonetheless argues for their 
commitment to the constitutional state. Owing to his trust in the rationality embodied in the 
modern state, Hegel advocates gradual institutional reforms, not recurrent revolution. The 
second claim was that in order to achieve and maintain concrete freedom and domestic 
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reconciliation, Hegel observes that the state has to be internally bounded and externally 
exclusive. The contrasting relationship between domestic reconciliation and interstate conflict 
is crucial for understanding Hegel’s views on the state, war, and international relations.  
This interpretation of Hegel’s political thought implies two things. One implication is 
to direct our attention to the fundamental purpose of the modern state. Many inquiries about 
the state and interstate relations tend to focus on the condition of sheer survival. Perhaps, the 
image of the state’s wrongdoings—such as forced displacement, genocide, or 
imperialistic/hegemonic war—is so strong that we are often oblivious to the actual idea of the 
rational state. But Hegel makes it clear that the significance of the state lies in the actualization 
of concrete freedom. In so doing, he questions whether concrete freedom can be effectively 
achieved in any alternative system to the state. Secondly, this reading urges us to examine if all 
conflicts at the interstate level ought to be considered as a negative obstacle to overcome. To 
be sure, it is understandable that contemporary theorists tend to reject interstate conflict 
altogether. Dehumanized modern warfare, with its WMD threats and drone strikes, presents 
a greater challenge to humanity. But we are also reminded of Hegel’s assertion that the rational 
state is necessary for mediating different individual interests and achieving concrete freedom. 
This claim in turn means that citizens need to cherish and cultivate the constitution and public 
institutions. Such a public commitment does not imply a docile subjection to the governing 
body, but rather a commitment to existing values and a willingness to sacrifice for their 
protection. The sort of interstate conflict as rooted in such patriotism is honor-driven, and the 
idea that rational states vie for honor and excellence needs a language different from that of 
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interest and fear.18 In short, we should explore and examine the honor-driven dimension of 
interstate conflict rather than dismissing it entirely in the first place. 
But this also means that we should be mindful of a problem Hegel’s state model creates. 
If an honor-driven confrontation among Hegelian states is intensified (as Hegel himself 
predicts), there might be a danger to slip into the process of (re-)constructing the state as a 
thicker community of authenticity by appealing to some pseudo-natural criteria. 19  The 
question is then whether Hegel’s state model has any effective way of resisting such a 
temptation. This also leads us to raise the question:  How do we cherish our common space 
for freedom and vie for honor and excellence, while not falling into the dangers of treating 
others as permanent enemies and engaging in a war of annihilation? How do we achieve 
concrete freedom and domestic reconciliation, while simultaneously relieving interstate 
conflict?  
In revealing this kind of complexity laid in freedom, the state, and war, Hegel’s 
challenge to world peace has a special meaning. And this insight has not been sufficiently 
reflected in the recent cosmopolitan theories that appropriate Hegel’s thought.  
  
 
18 For the fledging research on the honor-driven dimension of interstate conflict, see Lebow (2006) 
and Tsygankov (2014, pp, 13-27).    
 
19 Hegel is critical of Romanticism and tries to distinguish the national state from the constitutional 
state, the Rechtsstaat that is devoted to the rule of law. But as Villa (2008, pp, 252-254) notes, Hegel 
remains attached to the Romantic ideas, in that he objects to alienation and appeals to reconciliation 
between humanity and an increasingly objectified nature. Here, the concern is that the strong theme 
of reconciliation embedded in the Hegelian state may have the effect of treating alienated individuals 
as a thing to overcome in the long run, rather than as the critical entity that prevents any attempt to 
connect political communities with rigid claims of naturalness on which some type of Gemeinschaft is 
grounded.  
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